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TRADE LIBERALIZATION IN A JOINT SPATIAL 




This paper considers liberalization of trade in both inter-temporal intermediation services and 
goods in a joint spatial-inter-temporal trade model. Joint multi-commodity spatial 
intertemporal models are not (to our knowledge) used in the trade literature as general 
comparative statics results are unavailable and (in the presence of incomplete markets) 
existence can also be an issue. Here we use numerical simulation methods. We first consider 
world with service trade autarky in which there is no domestic intermediation service 
provision, and service trade liberalization involves costless inter-temporal intermediation 
provided by foreign service providers. This simple treatment allows us to model service trade 
liberalization as removing period by period budget constraints for domestic consumers. In 
such a world, if nonzero tariffs apply to spatial trade we present an example showing how 
service trade liberalization can be welfare worsening. One implication is that negotiations on 
services in the WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) need not be welfare 
improving if there are also ongoing tariff negotiations. We then expand the model to capture a 
more complex world where costly intermediation services can be provided by both within-
country and foreign providers. We again illustrate how services liberalization can be welfare 
worsening. We finally discuss whether welfare worsening service trade liberalization is likely 
in a real-world situation of highly restricted services trade and considerably more open goods 
trade, and when services trade are around 1/3 of total goods and services trade as is often 
claimed from available global service trade data. 
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Most of the policy literature on multilateral services trade liberalization under the WTO
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) implicitly assumes that such liberalization
is globally eﬃciency improving. Service liberalization is seen as extending the coverage of
existing WTO liberalization beyond trade in goods to also cover such service areas as
banking, insurance, telecoms, and transportation. As such, service trade liberalization is
implicitly accepted as globally desirable. 1
Some existing literature already suggests that such liberalization need not be welfare
improving but does not explicitly consider models with joint spatial and inter-temporal
trade. 2 Here we go further and treat service-trade liberalization as applying to intermedi-
ation services through time (banking) in a joint spatial - inter-temporal model. A similar
analysis can likely be applied to liberalization of trade in other intermediation services such
as across risk (insurance) and space (transportation, telecoms).
We consider liberalization of service trade of this type in a simple general equilibrium
model with both inter-temporal and spatial trade. In a series of 2 country, 2 good, and
2 period numerical simulation analyses, we consider cases in which tariﬀs distort trade
within periods both before and after service liberalization. Initially there is inter-temporal
autarky (no inter-temporal intermediation) in services, which, for simplicity, we characterize
as no domestic provision of intermediation services. Using this framework we are able to
separately consider both tariﬀ liberalization (removing or reducing tariﬀs) and services
liberalization which allows for foreign providers to enter domestic markets and remove
inter-temporal budget constraints. We are thus able to consider services liberalization in
1See Hindley and Smith (1984), McCulloch (1990), Hoekman (1995) and Dee and Hanslow (2001) al-
though also see Ryan (1990) and Whalley (2003) for further work which qualiﬁes this view.
2Chia and Whalley (1995) discuss a single time dated commodity inter-temporal trade model with costly
intermediation services over time, and with both domestic and foreign service providers. They report
a two-country example where international liberalization of trade in banking services which allows both
domestic and foreign providers to operate in all markets can be welfare worsening. This result occurs
because with transaction costs the two fundamental theorems need not hold (Foley (1970)). Also, the
literature on piecemeal policy reform (Hatta 1977) discusses the relative desirability of radial reductions
in tariﬀ rates on all commodities relative to more concentrated and larger reductions of tariﬀ for only a
subset of commodities, and this literature also seemingly applies to services liberalization in the presence of
restricted goods trade. Public ﬁnance literature discusses the related issue of the welfare gains from reduced
variance in tax (including trade tax) rates (see Harberger 1964).
3the presence of tariﬀs, tariﬀ liberalization in the presence of service trade restrictions, and
joint liberalization of both goods and services.
We explore whether services liberalization need be welfare improving in numerical ex-
amples. Initially, we consider a simple world in which there is no domestic provision of
intermediation services but liberalization permits foreign entry of costless service providers
who, in eﬀect, remove period by period budget constraints. This is in the spirit of the
literature on incomplete markets (Hart (1975), Duﬃe and Shafer (1985), Magill and Shafer
(1990)), but we do not explicitly consider uncertainty and we concentrate on numerical
solution and comparative static analyses rather than on existence. We then consider an ex-
tension to this model with costly intermediation and with both domestic and foreign service
providers both before and after liberalization. These two service providers have diﬀerential
costs. In this model, service trade liberalization typically increases the amount of inter-
mediation; inter-temporal intermediation services are used initially in both countries but
after liberalization are provided in both countries by the relatively more eﬃcient domestic
service provider.
To explore the possibility of perverse service liberalization outcomes, we calibrate the
joint inter-temporal and spatial trade models we develop to stylized (rather than real)
equilibrium data sets for 2 good 2 country 2 time period cases, and consider liberalization
of goods trade, services trade and both. We report experiments where with preexisting
tariﬀs services liberalization can be welfare worsening. We then assess for which portions of
the parameter space for the formalizations we explore perverse outcomes are likely to occur
through sensitivity analysis.
In a ﬁnal section we discuss how our analysis could relate to the contemporary global
economy where services trade is perhaps
1
3
of total goods and services trade, and services
are more heavily restricted than goods, albeit by regulatory devices more so than by tariﬀs.
The severity of service trade restrictions in this case seemingly makes it more likely that
services liberalization may be welfare improving, but this remains a judgmentally based
evaluation rather than a clearly established result.
General results are probably unattainable for the simulation structure we explore nu-
merically here, but the mere possibility that adding services liberalization to conventional
goods liberalization in the presence of goods trade restrictions can be welfare worsening is
important for the ways in which GATS and services liberalization in the WTO are currently
4discussed. Until such time that goods trade is free of restrictions the implication is that
services trade liberalization in the GATS needs to be shown to be welfare improving in
particular cases before it can be strongly advocated.
52 A Simple Multi-Country Model of Spatial and Inter-Temporal
Trade
To explore whether services trade liberalization under the framework of the GATS can
be welfare worsening in particular cases for joint spatial and inter-temporal trade models,
we use a simple 2 period (t = 0,1) 2 country (i = 1,2) 2 good (l = 1,2) pure exchange
model. In this, each country has a single representative consumer, each with endowments of
the two goods in each period (Et
il; t = 0,1, i = 1,2, l = 1,2). For simplicity, a time-additive

























i2 for t = 0,1 and i = 1,2. This can be represented more












i2, i = 1,2 (2)
where ρi is inter-temporal discount factor for individual i, Xt
il denotes consumption of good
l for country i at date t, and αt





We also later consider a single representative consumer for each country with a time-


















































































, i = 1,2 (3)
where σt
i is the constant elasticity of substitution between goods in consumption for country
i in periof t.
For any good l, in any period t, we can deﬁne the seller’s (net of tariﬀ) price as Pt
l and
we then allow each country i to impose tariﬀs at rate Tt








il = 0). Internal (gross of tariﬀ) prices for good l in country i at date t are thus
Pt
il = Pt
l (1 + Tt
il), t = 0,1, i = 1,2, l = 1,2. (4)
These are also sellers prices of good l in country i.









il)+, t = 0,1, i = 1,2 (5)
where Et
il denotes the initial endowment of good l for country i, and the total income of








i, t = 0,1, i = 1,2. (6)
To simplify matters, we initially assume that there is service autarky and that in this
case (and as a strong assumption) there no intermediation provided by domestic service
providers. This is clearly an artiﬁcial construct (which we relax later) whose main virtue
is simplicity. This enables us to appeal directly to relevant literature on multi-commodity
inter-temporal models from Radner(1972), Hart (1975), Duﬃe and Shafer (1985), Werner
(1985), Duﬃe (1987), Geanakopolos (1990), Magill and Shafer (1991), and Magill and
Quinzii (1996) in analysing the eﬀects of service liberalization in this simple way. We do
this without the added complication of uncertainty which is central to this liberalization.
Most of this literature is concerned with existence issues; our focus here is comparative
statics. We assume for now (and also for further simplicity) that under free trade in services,
intermediation services are provided costlessly by foreign banks. 3
This means that in the autarky case, period by period budget constraints apply for each

















l (1 + Tt
il)Et
il + Rt
i, t = 0,1; i = 1,2. (7)
3See the discussion of barriers to trade in intermediation services in practice in Chen and Schembri (2002),
Francois and Schuknecht (2000), Kalirajan, McHuire, Nguyen and Schuele (2001), and Mattoo (1999).
































i, i = 1,2. (8)
This simple treatment of services liberalization allows us to consider two diﬀerent equi-
libria, one with period by period budget constraints, and the other only with across period
budget constraints. Moving from period by period budget constraints to an across period
budget constraint can be thought of as allowing for inter-temporal intermediation in con-
sumption activities across periods where non previously occurred. The interpretation is
that initially there is autarky in trade in intermediation services since none can be provided
domestically. We then open up to international trade in intermediation services, which are
costlessly provided, a simple form of trade liberalization in inter-temporal intermediation
services. We can thus consider goods trade liberalization as a reduction in tariﬀs where no
service liberalization occurs, or service liberalization where no tariﬀ liberalization occurs.
We can also consider services liberalization in a tariﬀ-free world, and tariﬀ liberalization in
a world either with or without service restrictions. Finally, we can consider joint tariﬀ and
services liberalization.
This joint spatial inter-temporal economy can be thought of as one in which there are
a series of spot markets in goods, and in the presence of services liberalization a system of
asset markets which permit the transfer of income among spot markets in the sense ﬁrst
analyzed by Arrow (1964) and later by Hart (1975), Werner (1985), and Magill and Shafer
(1991). 4 It contrasts with earlier inter-temporal equilibrium formalizations of a set of
Arrow-Debreu contingent commodity markets as in Debreu (1959).
4Hart (1975) showed, with uncertainty and hence incomplete markets, an equilibrium may not exist, or an
ineﬃcient equilibrium may result. Werner (1985) discusses the general issue of existence for such economies;
Magill and Shafer (1991) show among others results how in the certainty case the multi-commodity inter-
temporal equilibrium is equivalent to one in which an interest rate is endogenously determined and equals
the ratio of the shadow prices of period by period budget constraints for each of the individuals in the
economy.
8The two equilibria we consider for this structure can be stated as follows.
[Deﬁnition] General Equilibrium with Period by Period Budget Constraints
A general equilibrium for this economy with period by period budget constraints is
characterized by a price system and consumption of goods by countries ((Pt
l : t = 0,1;l =
1,2),(Xt
il : t = 0,1;i = 1,2;l = 1,2)) such that
[1] given (Pt
l ;t = 0,1,l = 1,2), for i = 1, 2, (Xt
il;t = 0,1,l = 1,2) solve the utility
maximization problem subject to the period by period budget constraints (7),




















l (1 + Tt
il)Et
il + Rt
i, t = 0,1;








il, t = 0,1; l = 1,2.
[Deﬁnition] General Equilibrium with Across Period Budget Constraints
A general equilibrium for this economy with combined budget constraints over periods
is characterized by a price system and consumption of goods by countries ((Pt
l : t = 0,1;l =
1,2),(Xt
il : t = 0,1;i = 1,2;l = 1,2)) such that
[1] given (Pt
l ;t = 0,1,l = 1,2), for i = 1, 2, (Xt
il;t = 0,1,l = 1,2) solves the utility
maximization problem subject to the combined across period budget constraint (8),







































il, t = 0,1; l = 1,2.





l (1 + T0
il)X0

















l (1 + T1
il)E1
il + R1
i + Fi (10)
9where Fi represents the amount of lending (borrowing) by (from) one individual to (by) the
other.
The across period budget constraint equilibrium is the same as an equilibrium character-
ized by a price system and consumption of goods by countries ((Pt
l : t = 0,1;l = 1,2),(Xt
il :
t = 0,1;i = 1,2;l = 1,2)) such that
[1] given (Pt
l ;t = 0,1,l = 1,2), for i = 1, 2, (Xt
il;t = 0,1,l = 1,2) solve the utility
maximization problem subject to the budget constraints (9) - (10)
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Setting the interest rate (for both lenders and borrowers) in the two countries equal to




l (1 + T0
il)X0

















l (1 + T1
il)E1
il + R1
i + [1 + r]Fi (12)
Thus, the across period equilibrium is equivalent to an equilibrium with the same lending
and borrowing interest rate, characterized by a price system and consumption of goods by
countries ((Pt
l : t = 0,1;l = 1,2),(Xt
il : t = 0,1;i = 1,2;l = 1,2)) such that
[1] given (Pt
l ;t = 0,1,l = 1,2), for i = 1, 2, (Xt
il;t = 0,1,l = 1,2) solve the utility
maximization problem subject to the budget constraints (11) - (12)
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l (1 + T1
il)E1
il + R1
i + [1 + r]Fi












If tariﬀ rates are zero on both products in both countries at both dates (Tt
il = 0 for
t = 0,1 and i = 1,2 and l = 1,2), then these equilibria are also free trade competitive
equilibria.
Comparing across these equilibria in this simpliﬁed world enable us to consider the
eﬀects of services liberalization (in the sense assumed here) in the presence of restrictions
on goods trade.
113 Numerical Analysis of Trade Liberalization in a Simple
Joint Spatial Inter-Temporal Trade Model
We can use the structures presented in the previous section in numerical equilibrium
analysis by comparing across equilibria for particular parameterizations and assessing the
impacts of alternative trade liberalizations. In using the model structure set out above to
compute equilibria for these economies we also need to assume that the direction of trade




and exports good 2 (Xt
12 ≤ Et
12 and Tt




21 = 0) and imports good 2 (Xt
22 ≥ Et
22 and Tt




11) for buyers in country 1 and Pt
21 = Pt
1 for sellers from country 2, and
the price of good 2 is Pt
12 = Pt
















Table 1 sets out a parameterization for a Cobb - Douglas inter-temporal spatial 2 country
economy with and without tariﬀs. The parameter values used here are arbitrarily selected.
Except for the share parameters this is a symmetric speciﬁcation across countries including
of the inter-temporal discount factors used in the two countries. Tariﬀ rates are speciﬁed
as positive when the direction of trade implies an import by that country. We later per-
form parametric variation around this speciﬁcation to search for other examples of welfare
worsening liberalization of services in the presence of tariﬀs and also analyze other forms of
liberalization.
In Table 2 we report Hicksian Equivalent Variation money metric welfare measures of
the impacts of various liberalizations both for individual economies and for the world using
the parametric speciﬁcation in Table 1. In this table Hicksian measures are expressed as
a percentage of reference equilibrium (pre-liberalization) incomes. Here, results show that
goods liberalization yields a welfare gain, while services liberalization in the presence of
tariﬀs yields a welfare loss. Larger gains occur if tariﬀs and services are jointly removed,
implying these two liberalization have non additive eﬀects. Services liberalization if tariﬀs
are already zero yields gains instead of losses. Goods liberalization when services are already
liberalized yields considerably larger gains.
12We then use parametric variation around this base case speciﬁcation to reevaluate the
gains from alternative liberalizations. The left part of Figure 1 shows how welfare measures
of the global impact of liberalization in services behave if we vary the value of ρ2 (the
inter-temporal discount rate in country 2). For low values less than 0.0447 and higher than
0.2116 a gain occurs, indicating the parametric sensitivity of the sign of the welfare impact
of services liberalization. In the right panel when the same discount factor in both countries
is varied, for all ρ values there is a loss.
As we vary only the value of ρ2 in further cases (not shown in Figure 1), the EV as a % of
reference equilibrium incomes is positive for the following four cases: (1) moving from base
case to goods liberalization, (2) moving to services liberalization when goods are already
liberalized, (3) moving to goods liberalization when services are already liberalized, and (4)
moving from base case to joint goods and services liberalization. In the right part of Figure
1, when we vary the value of ρ for both countries, the EV as a % of reference equilibrium
incomes in the case of services liberalization remains as negative. For the other three cases:
(1) moving from base case to goods liberalization, (2) moving to goods liberalization when
services are already liberalized, and (3) moving from base case to joint goods and services
liberalization, the country 1 EV impacts change from gain to loss, and country 2 and the
world (2 countries) gain.
Tables 3 and 4 show comparable results for the CES case with inter-commodity prefer-
ence elasticities of substitution set (arbitrarily) to 2.0 and 0.5 for the 2 countries. Here there
is a gain rather than a loss under services liberalization, and eﬀects compared to the Cobb
- Douglas case are larger. Figure 2 shows how welfare measures of the impacts of services
liberalization behave for similar parametric variations for ρ (inter-temporal discount rates).
Here, when ρ2 is varied only for country 2 in the left part loss occur with low values, and
gains for higher values, indicating the parametric sensitivity of the sign of the welfare impact
of services liberalization. A sharply diﬀerent picture change country impacts compared to
the Cobb Douglas case emerges for the case where ρ is valued for both countries.
13Table 1 A Parameterization of a Cobb - Douglas Spatial and Inter-Temporal
Economy Used to Analyze Joint Goods and Services Liberalization
Inter-Temporal Discount Factor ρ1 = 0.10 and ρ2 = 0.10
Share Parameters Period 0 Period 1
αt
il Good 1 Good 2 Good 1 Good 2
Country 1 0.70 0.30 0.60 0.40
Country 2 0.40 0.60 0.30 0.70
Initial Endowments Period 0 Period 1
Et
il Good 1 Good 2 Good 1 Good 2
Country 1 40 80 40 80
Country 2 80 40 80 40
Initial Tariﬀ Rates Period 0 Period 1
Tt
il Good 1 Good 2 Good 1 Good 2
Country 1 0.10 0.00 0.05 0.00
Country 2 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.10
14Table 2 Welfare Consequences of Alternative Liberalizations
Using the Cobb - Douglas Economy Parameterization from Table 1
Hicksian Equivalent Variation as %
of Original Equilibrium Income from
Both Countries
Country 1 Country 2 (The World)
Moving from Base Case to
Goods Liberalization 0.0373 0.0766 0.0570
Moving to Services Liberalization
when Goods Are Already liberalized 0.0069 0.0070 0.0070
Moving from Base Case to
Services Liberalization -0.1530 -0.1535 -0.1533
Moving to Goods Liberalization
when Services Are Already Liberalized 0.1975 0.2375 0.2175
Moving from Base Case to
Joint Goods and Services Liberalization 0.0442 0.0837 0.0640
15Table 3 A Parameterization of a CES Spatial Inter-Temporal Economy
Used to Analyze Joint Goods and Services Liberalization
Elasticity of Substitution Period 0 Period 1
σt
i
Country 1 2.00 0.50
Country 2 0.50 2.00
Inter-Temporal Discount Factor ρ1 = 0.10 and ρ2 = 0.10
Share Parameters Period 0 Period 1
αt
il Good 1 Good 2 Good 1 Good 2
Country 1 0.70 0.30 0.60 0.40
Country 2 0.40 0.60 0.30 0.70
Initial Endowments Period 0 Period 1
Et
il Good 1 Good 2 Good 1 Good 2
Country 1 40 80 40 80
Country 2 80 40 80 40
Initial Tariﬀ Rates Period 0 Period 1
Tt
il Good 1 Good 2 Good 1 Good 2
Country 1 0.10 0.00 0.05 0.00
Country 2 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.10
16Table 4 Welfare Consequences of Alternative Liberalizations
Using the CES Economy Parameterization from Table 3
Hicksian Equivalent Variation as %
of Original Equilibrium Income from
Both Countries
Country 1 Country 2 (The World)
Moving from Base Case to
Goods Liberalization 0.0092 0.1605 0.0848
Moving to Services Liberalization
when Goods Are Already liberalized 0.2848 0.3947 0.3397
Moving from Base Case to
Services Liberalization 0.1812 0.4170 0.2991
Moving to Goods Liberalization
when Services Are Already Liberalized 0.1126 0.1383 0.1254
Moving from Base Case to
Joint Goods and Services Liberalization 0.2940 0.5558 0.4249
174 A Model of Spatial and Inter-Temporal Trade with Costly
Intermediation Services
The model used in the previous two sections is highly simpliﬁed in that it considers a
general equilibrium structure with no intermediation in autarky and costless foreign sup-
plied intermediation services under service trade liberalization. Where intermediation oc-
curs under liberalization, the same interest rate for lending and borrowing applies in both
countries, which is equivalent to an across period budget constraint equilibrium for the two
countries combined. A more realistic structure involves costly intermediation with diﬀerent
costs faced by service providers in the two countries. Under liberalization of service trade
more eﬃcient foreign service providers then displace domestic service providers in one of
the country markets. To develop such a structure we need a model in which interest rates
are diﬀerent between lenders and borrowers due to intermediation costs, and we also need
to use diﬀerent concepts of equilibrium.
We ﬁrst consider a case where there is still costless intermediation between periods in
each country, but intermediation across countries within the period is allowed up to some
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il)X1
il = I1





l (1 + T0
il)X0

















l (1 + T1
il)E1
il + R1
i + [1 + ri]Fi (15)
where Fi is the amount borrowed by a consumer in one country from the other country con-
sumer via banks. With costless intermediation, ri is the lending and borrowing interest rate
in country i. In this structure, Fi can be set by policy (allowable credit, or money issuance)
with ri endogenously determined, or ri can be set with Fi endogenously determined.
In the costless intermediation case, a general equilibrium for this economy (with the
interest rate for lending and borrowing ri for i = 1,2) is characterized by a price system and
18consumption of goods by countries ((Pt
l : t = 0,1;l = 1,2),(Xt
il : t = 0,1;i = 1,2;l = 1,2))
such that
[1] given (Pt
l ;t = 0,1,l = 1,2), for i = 1, 2, (Xt
il;t = 0,1,l = 1,2) solve the utility
maximization problem subject to the budget constraints (14) - (15)
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If we then consider costly intermediation services with (in the no services trade case)
diﬀerent interest rates for lending and borrowing for each country, the budget constraints
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l (1 + T1
il)E1
il + R1
i + [1 + ri(Fi)]Fi (19)






i , if Fi ≥ 0
rB




i are the interest rates for lending (deposits or saving) and borrowing in




i . The budget constraints (18) - (19)
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l (1 + T1
il)E1
il + R1
i + [1 + rD
i ]F+
i − [1 + rB
i ]F−
i (22)
Since in the presence of costly intermediation, rB
i ≥ rD
i for i = 1,2, we can represent
intermediation costs in country i by the parameter λi such that rB
i = (1 + λi)rD
i . If
intermediation services are provided by banks in country i, λ1 > λ2 implies that banks in
country 2 are more eﬃcient than in country 1; while λ2 > λ1 implies that banks in country
1 are more eﬃcient than in country 2.
This then allow us to characterize two equilibria in the presence of costly banking ser-
vices; one with no trade in banking services (autarky in banking) and one with free trade
in banking services.
Equilibrium with Autarky in Intermediation Services (Intermediation Ser-
vices Are Only Provided by Domestic Banks)
If we assume that depositors can deposit money in any bank, they receive the same
interest rate in both countries, i.e. rD = rD
1 = rD
2 . But if borrowers can only borrow from
domestic banks, rB
1 6= rB
2 . In autarky, intermediation services are only provided by domestic
banks and the intermediation costs are ICi = rB
i −rD = λirD. If IC1 > IC2, then banking
services cost more in country 1; if IC2 > IC1, then banking services cost more in country
2. The value (cost) of intermediation services is given by (rB
i −rD)Fi = λirDFi for i = 1,2.
A general equilibrium for an international economy with autarky in intermediation ser-
vices and diﬀerent interest rates for lending and borrowing (related through λi for i = 1,2)
is characterized by a price system and consumption of goods by countries (rD,(Pt
l : t =
0,1;l = 1,2),(Xt
il : t = 0,1;i = 1,2;l = 1,2)) such that
[1] given rD and (Pt
l ;t = 0,1,l = 1,2)), for i = 1, 2, (Xt
il;t = 0,1,l = 1,2) solve the
20utility maximization problem subject to the budget constraints (18) - (19)
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il for l = 1,2
If we then allow trade to occur in intermediation services, this yields a diﬀerent equilib-
rium concept to that used earlier in the costless intermediation case.
Equilibrium with Free Trade in Intermediation Services (Intermediation Ser-
vices Are Provided by Either Domestic or Foreign Banks)
If depositors receive the same interest rate anywhere, once again rD = rD
1 = rD
2 , since in-
dividuals can deposit money in any bank. But with free trade in banking services, borrowers
can borrow from either domestic or foreign banks, which implies that the same borrowing
rate applies anywhere, i.e. rB = min{rB
1 ,rB
2 } = [1 + λ]rD, where λ = min{λ1,λ2}. In-
termediation services in this case can be provided by either domestic or foreign banks.
Intermediation costs are IC = rB − rD = λrD across the two countries, which means
that the more eﬃcient country suppliers provide intermediation services to both of the two
countries. The value (cost) of intermediation services are (rB −rD)Fi = λrDFi for i = 1,2.
A general equilibrium for this economy with diﬀerent interest rates for lending and bor-
rowing (related through λi for i = 1,2) is characterized by a price system and consumption
of goods by countries (rD,(Pt
l : t = 0,1;l = 1,2),(Xt
il : t = 0,1;i = 1,2;l = 1,2)) such that
[1] given rD and (Pt
l ;t = 0,1,l = 1,2), for i = 1, 2, (Xt
il;t = 0,1,l = 1,2) solve the
utility maximization problem subject to the budget constraints (18) - (19)
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rD, if Fi ≥ 0
rB, if Fi ≤ 0
Table 5 sets out a parameterization for a Cobb - Douglas economy with tariﬀs for
this model. The parameters of inter-temporal discount factors, share parameters, initial
endowment, and initial tariﬀ rates are taken from Table 1 in Section 3. The intermediation
cost factors are assumed to be λ1 = 0.25 and λ2 = 0.50. We somewhat arbitrarily
take F1 = 32 and F2 = −32 for the base case in which diﬀerent interest rates prevail in
each country. The value of interest rates are rD = rD
1 = rD
2 = 0.03995, rB
1 = 0.04994
and rB
2 = 0.05993 in the equilibrium with autarky in intermediation services, and rD =
rD
1 = rD
2 = 0.08032, rB
1 = 0.10040 and rB
2 = 0.12049 in the equilibrium with free trade in
intermediation services.
In Table 6 we report Hicksian Equivalent Variation money metric welfare measures of
the impacts of goods and services liberalization both for individual countries and the world
for this model. Hicksian measures are expressed as a percentage of reference equilibrium
(pre-liberalization) incomes. Here, for computational reasons we consider incomplete goods
liberalization in this table which changes tariﬀ rates from T0
11 = T1





22 = 0.05 and T0
22 = T1
11 = 0.00. Moving to goods liberalization whether
services are or not liberalized yields a welfare gain, while moving to services liberalization
whether goods are liberalized or not yields a welfare loss.
We then once again conduct parametric variation around this base case speciﬁcation and
reevaluate the gains from alternative liberalizations. Figure 3 shows how welfare measures
of the global impact of liberalization in goods or services behave if we only vary the value
of ρ2 (the inter-temporal discount rate in country 2). There are losses for country 1 and
the world, however, welfare eﬀects change from a loss to a gain for country 2.
Tables 7 and 8 show comparable results for a CES case with inter-commodity elasticities
of substitution set equal to 2.0 and 0.5 in the 2 countries. These yield diﬀerent results
from Table 8 for the Cobb - Douglas case. In Table 8, moving from base case to services
liberalization yields a welfare loss. Figure 4 shows how welfare measures of the global impact
of liberalization in services behave for similar parametric variations from ρ2 (inter-temporal
22discount rate in country 2). In the left part, when ρ2 is varied only for country 1 loss occur,
country 2 and the world loss with low values, and gains for higher values for the services
liberalization whether goods are or not already liberalized.
23Table 5 A Parameterization of a Cobb - Douglas Spatial
and Inter-Temporal Economy with Costly Intermediation
Used to Analyze Joint Goods and Services Trade Liberalization
Inter-Temporal Discount Factor ρ1 = 0.10 and ρ2 = 0.10
Share Parameters Period 0 Period 1
αt
il Good 1 Good 2 Good 1 Good 2
Country 1 0.70 0.30 0.60 0.40
Country 2 0.40 0.60 0.30 0.70
Initial Endowments Period 0 Period 1
Et
il Good 1 Good 2 Good 1 Good 2
Country 1 40 80 40 80
Country 2 80 40 80 40
Initial Tariﬀ Rates Period 0 Period 1
Tt
il Good 1 Good 2 Good 1 Good 2
Country 1 0.10 0.00 0.05 0.00
Country 2 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.10
Amount Borrowed / Lent F1 = 32 and F2 = −32
Intermediation Cost Factor λ1 = 0.25 and λ2 = 0.50
24Table 6 Welfare Consequences of Alternative Liberalizations1
Using the Cobb - Douglas Economy Parameterization from Table 1,
but with Costly Intermediation
Hicksian Equivalent Variation as %
of Original Equilibrium Income from
Both Countries
Country 1 Country 2 (The World)
Moving from Base Case to
Goods Liberalization 0.0933 0.0792 0.0863
Moving to Services Liberalization
when Goods Are Already liberalized -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003
Moving from Base Case to
Services Liberalization -0.0015 -0.0014 -0.0014
Moving to Goods Liberalization
when Services Are Already Liberalized 0.0945 0.0803 0.0874
Moving from Base Case to
Joint Goods and Services Liberalization 0.0931 0.0789 0.0860





11 = 0.05 to T0
11 = T1
22 = 0.05 and T0
22 = T1
11 = 0.00, for case of numerical
solution of the model.
25Table 7 A Parameterization of a CES Spatial Inter-Temporal Economy
Used to Analyze Joint Goods and Services Liberalization
Constant Elasticity of Substitution Period 0 Period 1
σt
i
Country 1 2.00 0.50
Country 2 0.50 2.00
Inter-Temporal Discount Factor ρ1 = 0.10 and ρ2 = 0.10
Share Parameters Period 0 Period 1
αt
il Good 1 Good 2 Good 1 Good 2
Country 1 0.70 0.30 0.60 0.40
Country 2 0.40 0.60 0.30 0.70
Initial Endowments Period 0 Period 1
Et
il Good 1 Good 2 Good 1 Good 2
Country 1 40 80 40 80
Country 2 80 40 80 40
Initial Tariﬀ Rates Period 0 Period 1
Tt
il Good 1 Good 2 Good 1 Good 2
Country 1 0.10 0.00 0.05 0.00
Country 2 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.10
Amount Borrowed / Lent F1 = 32 and F2 = −32
Intermediation Cost Factor λ1 = 0.25 and λ2 = 0.50
26Table 8 Welfare Consequences of Alternative Liberalizations
Using the CES Economy Parameterization from Table 3,
but with Costly Intermediation
Hicksian Equivalent Variation as %
of Original Equilibrium Income from
Both Countries
Country 1 Country 2 (The World)
Moving from Base Case to
Goods Liberalization 12.9822 27.9915 20.4874
Moving to Services Liberalization
when Goods Are Already liberalized 0.2970 0.6536 0.4755
Moving from Base Case to
Services Liberalization -1.6964 -0.3275 -1.0119
Moving to Goods Liberalization
when Services Are Already Liberalized 14.9785 28.9754 21.9778
Moving from Base Case to
Joint Goods and Services Liberalization 13.2796 28.6470 20.9638
275 Concluding Remarks and Possible Implications for The
World Trading System
This paper discusses joint liberalization of spatial and inter-temporal trade in a multi-
good multi-period numerical model. The background to this discussion is the issue of
whether services trade liberalization in the WTO under the GATS need necessarily be
globally welfare improving if free trade in goods does not already apply, noting that there
is little trade literature on multi-period / multi-good models in part because general results
are not easily obtained. Here we use a numerical simulation approach which we apply to
two models which diﬀer in their complexity.
In a model with costless banking we consider services liberalization to imply foreign
banking entry where in autaky no domestic banks exist. Their entry relaxes period by
period budget constraints. A more complex model considers domestic and foreign service
providers with diﬀerent (but constant) costs. Liberalization in banking service trade allows
domestic residents full access to foreign banks. We consider cases with both Cobb - Douglas
and CES preferences over goods within the period, and draw on formalization on asset and
spot market equilibrium literature originating with Arrow. We are relatively easily able
to produce examples where in the presence of tariﬀs banking liberalization can be welfare
worsening.
How this discussion relates to actual GATS liberalization remains an unresolved issue.
The results reported on in earlier sections do not directly bear on actual trade patterns in
goods and services in the global economy, nor do they relate to actual barriers in place today.
Estimates of international trade in services are notoriously imprecise (see the discussion of
measurement of trade in banking services in St.Hilaire and Whalley (1995)), but a commonly




of combined trade in goods and services. They are also supposedly growing
at twice the rate of trade in goods. Tariﬀs on goods post Uruguay Round are low on
most goods (with a few peaks in areas such as textiles), with other restrictions applying
through anti dumping duties, quotas (textiles) standards, and other non tariﬀ measures.
Services are gradually thought to be heavily restricted through domestic regulation, licensing
requirements, conduct and performance restrictions for foreign entities, and related devices.
Under this view of the world, then, depending on cost diﬀerentials across domestic and
28foreign services providers is that there could well be net beneﬁts from signiﬁcant liberaliza-
tion in services independently of further tariﬀ liberalization. The claim would that there
have been be 50 years of tariﬀ liberalization in the GATT / WTO, but with less or little
services liberalization. If so, GATS services liberalization could well yield positive gains,
but whether this is so needs to be established rather than simply asserted.
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